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The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong. Using the methodology of
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009), we estimate income distributions, poverty rates, and inequality
and welfare indices for African countries for the period 1970-2006. We show that: (1) African poverty
is falling and is falling rapidly; (2) if present trends continue, the poverty Millennium Development
Goal of halving the proportion of people with incomes less than one dollar a day will be achieved
on time; (3) the growth spurt that began in 1995 decreased African income inequality instead of increasing
it; (4) African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained by a large country, or
even by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geographical or historical characteristic.
All classes of countries, including those with disadvantageous geography and history, experience
reductionsin poverty. In particular, poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for
mineral-richas well as mineral-poor countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture;
forcountries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below- or above-median slave exports
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1  Introduction 
After three decades of zero or negative growth, Africa began a growth spurt around 1995 
that has been sustained at least to 2006.  Some analysts claim that this growth trend has not 
been strong enough to reduce poverty. For example, in its 2008 Millennium Development Goals 
Report, the United Nations Development Program contends that “the goal of cutting in half the 
proportion of people in the developing world living on less than $1 a day by 2015 remains within 
reach. However, this achievement will be due largely to extraordinary economic success in most 
of Asia. In contrast, previous estimates suggest that little progress was made in reducing 
extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.”  The World Bank concurs: “In 1990, 28.3 percent of the 
people in low and middle-income countries lived on less than $1 a day. By 1999 the share had 
fallen to 21.6 percent, driven mainly by strong growth in China and India (…) In Sub-Saharan, 
where the GDP per capita fell by 5 percent, the extreme poverty rate rose from 47.4 percent in 
1990 to 49 percent in 1999. The numbers are believed to be still rising” (World Bank 2004) The 
U.N. Millennium Campaign Deputy Director for Africa says: “Poverty continues to intensify due 
to the exclusion of groups of people on the basis of class, caste, gender, disability, age, race, 
religion and other status,” (UN Millennium Campaign 2009) This conventional wisdom is further 
documented and critically reviewed in Easterly (2009).  
It is also believed that most of the recent African growth is due to rising oil and natural 
resource prices, which entails a redistribution of income from mineral-poor countries to 
mineral-rich countries (Collier 2006). Moreover, gains from natural resource wealth are believed 
to accrue to very narrow elites and to be irrelevant for poverty reduction. These claims imply 
that African growth should be accompanied by rapidly rising inequality, which is testable with 
data. 
In this paper, we use the methodology of Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) to 
estimate income distributions for African countries, and compute their poverty rates, and 
inequality and welfare indices for the period 1970-2006. Our results show that the conventional 
wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong. In fact, since 1995, African poverty has 
been falling steadily. Moreover, contrary to the commonly held idea that African growth is 
largely based on natural resources and helps only the rich and well-connected, we show that 
Africa’s income distribution has become less rather than more unequal than it was in 1995, and 
therefore, that a great deal of this growth has accrued to the poor. Specifically, Africa’s growth   3 
trend in 1995 has been accompanied by a symmetric, sustained reduction in poverty that places 
it on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty within a few years of 
2015. If countries hit by exceptional adverse shocks like Congo-Zaire
2 converge to the average 
African poverty rate, then the first poverty MDG will actually be achieved two years in advance 
of 2015. 
Not only has poverty fallen in Africa as a whole, but this decline has been remarkably 
general across types of countries that the literature suggests should have different growth 
performances.  In particular, poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for 
mineral-rich as well as mineral-poor countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable 
agriculture; for countries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below- or above-
median slave exports per capita during the African slave trade.
3 Hence, the substantial decline in 
poverty is not driven by any particular country or set of countries. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of 
the data and the statistical procedure to estimate the income distributions of African countries 
and of all of Africa in every year in the sample period. Section 3 describes the evolution of the 
income distributions. Section 4 analyzes the evolution of poverty rates in Africa.  Section 5 
provides measures of inequality and welfare. Section 6 discusses the evolution of poverty for 
various African regions. Section 7 provides robustness checks, and section 8 concludes. 
   
2  Data and statistical procedure 
We use national accounts purchasing-power-parity (PPP)-adjusted GDP data from Penn 
World Tables, Mark 6.2.  We use this series because it is the standard GDP series used in the 
study of economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In the robustness checks, we 
                                                               
2 The Democratic Republic of Congo was called Zaire for most of our sample period (until 1997). 
We will refer to the country as Congo-Zaire in this paper. 
3 Bloom and Sachs (1998) suggest that landlocked countries, or countries with unfavorable 
agriculture have poorer performance than geographically advantaged countries. La Porta et al. 
(1999) argue that the identity of the colonizer may matter for subsequent economic 
development. Nunn (2008) presents evidence that the impact of the African slave trade was 
highly persistent, and affected recent African performance.   4 
experiment with other national accounts-based series with comprehensive coverage of all 
countries and years we consider, but with different corrections for PPP. 
We obtain inequality data from the WIDER-DS dataset, pioneered by Deininger and 
Squire (1996) and maintained by the United Nations University. The dataset provides Gini 
coefficients and quintile shares for countries and years in which income or consumption surveys 
were conducted. In order to maintain comparability of the survey data, we select surveys from 
WIDER-DS following special criteria and we adjust surveys with consumption data so that they 
are comparable to surveys with income data, which is described in detail by Pinkovskiy and Sala-
i-Martin (2009). Overall, we have 118 surveys for the 48 African countries considered. 
 Our procedure exactly follows Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009). The crux of the 
methodology is to assume that the distribution of income in each country and each year has the 
same functional form, with changes in GDP and inequality manifesting themselves through 
changes in the parameters of this form only. Then, we use the survey data to recover the 
functional form parameters, and from these parameters we can compute any statistic of the 
distribution of income for any country or for all of Africa that we want. Following Pinkovskiy and 
Sala-i-Martin (2009), our baseline functional form is lognormal but, as a robustness check, we 
also consider Gamma and Weibull distributions. These distributions are mathematically 
convenient because they have a single parameter that determines the mean of the distribution 
(the scale parameter), and a single parameter that determines the degree of inequality of the 
distribution (the distribution parameter). In particular, the Gini coefficient and the quintile 
shares of each distribution are functions of the distribution parameter alone. Hence, it is very 
easy to compute the distribution parameter on the basis of the survey data alone, and then to 
compute the scale parameter on the basis of the distribution parameter and GDP, so that the 
mean of the distribution of each country is given exactly by GDP. We proceed as follows: 
I) For country-years with surveys, our baseline method for obtaining the distribution 
parameter is to choose the distribution parameter that minimizes the sum of squared deviations 
between the quintile shares in the data and the theoretical predicted quintile shares based on 
the distribution parameter. In our robustness section we experiment with two methods. The 
first is to invert the theoretical expression for the Gini coefficient. The second method is similar 
to the baseline method, except we replace the 5 quintile shares by the three middle quintile 
shares divided by the total share of the middle 60%, and minimize the squared deviations of   5 
these three numbers from their theoretically predicted values. We ignore the top and bottom 
quintile shares because there may be considerable doubt as to the accuracy of the surveys in 
reporting the incomes of the very rich (who may be unwilling to participate, or who may lie 
outright to conceal their income) and the very poor (whose income may be in kind, and hence, 
converted into a monetary equivalent with error). Using only the three middle shares avoids 
these problems so long as all survey respondents are correctly placed into the quintile of the 
sample that they belong to, which is much more likely than that their income is reported 
correctly. 
 II) For countries and years without survey data, we impute a Gini coefficient, which we 
then invert to get the distribution parameter. If the country in question has two or more surveys 
in other years, we impute the Ginis for a year without data by interpolating and extrapolating 
the series of Gini coefficients we have from WIDER-DS. In the robustness section, we experiment 
with different interpolation and extrapolation procedures in the robustness checks. We then 
compute the average of the Gini series for all countries with two or more surveys (weighting 
such countries equally). For countries with no surveys, we impute this average Gini series. For 
countries with exactly one survey, we impute the average Gini series but shift it vertically to 
coincide with the single observation of the Gini for that country in the year in which this 
observation is made. 
III) For each country in each year, we compute the scale parameter from GDP and the 
distribution parameter. 
IV) Using the assumed functional forms and the calculated parameters, we compute 
poverty and inequality statistics for each country, for all of Africa, and for any groups of 
countries of special interest. 
In our robustness checks, we experiment with varying the GDP source, the assumed 
functional form, the method of interpolation and extrapolation, and the method of recovering 
the distribution parameter. We list these variations below: 
a)  We consider GDP from the Penn World Tables, 6.2; GDP from Angus Maddison’s 
website (dated 2007), which uses different PPP adjustments from the Penn World Tables; and 
GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, with data from both before and   6 
after the 2007 PPP revision by the World Bank. Hence, we experiment with a wide variety of 
purchasing power parity adjustments. 
b) We consider three parametric functional forms for the income distribution: 
lognormal, gamma and Weibull. The lognormal functional form is very commonly used, whereas 
the gamma and Weibull tend to predict more inequality for the same quintile shares than the 
lognormal form. 
c) We consider three methods of extrapolation and interpolation: i) horizontal 
extrapolation and piecewise cubic interpolation, ii) linear interpolation and extrapolation, iii) 
horizontal interpolation and horizontal extrapolation, although if the last two surveys happened 
in consecutive years, linear extrapolation is used. Linear extrapolation allows for greater 
variation of inequality in the period after our data ends, and allows strong responses of 
inequality to trends at the point at which our data ends. 
d) We consider three methods of recovering distribution parameters from data: i) 
minimize least squares of quintiles, ii) minimize least squares of ratios of each of the middle 
three quintiles to their sum,  iii) invert the Gini.  
For our baseline estimates, we make the following choices: 
•  GDP data from PWT 6.2 
•  Cubic splines to interpolate between available survey data, and extrapolate by 
horizontal projection. 
•  Lognormal distributions in all countries, and recover scale parameters from least 
squares minimization on quintiles. 
These choices are most consistent with the previous literature on measuring world 
income distribution and with the growth literature in general.  
 
3  Dynamics of the African Distribution of Income  
Figures 1 through 4 present graphs of distributions of income for Africa as well as for 
various African countries. To have a visual anchor, each of the graphs contains three vertical   7 
lines corresponding to daily incomes of $1, $2 and $3. The one-dollar-a-day poverty line 
corresponds to 554 dollars per year, since the “poverty line” referred to in the United Nations’ 
Millenium Development Goals was originally defined by the World Bank as one dollar a day in 
1985 prices, and  $365 in 1985 US dollars is $554 in 2000 US dollars, the currency unit of the 
Penn World Tables. The $2/day and $3/day thresholds are exactly twice and three times the 
$1/day line. 
Figure 1 plots the 1970 distributions for the largest countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo-
Zaire and South Africa) as well as for the entire continent. We see that the mode of the 
Ethiopian distribution is the lowest while the South African mode is the highest. However, the 
dispersion of the Nigerian distribution is so large that the number of Nigerians at the lowest 
levels of income is larger than that of any other large African country. The mode of African 
distribution is located slightly above the $1/day line while the $2/day and $3/day lines are far 
above the mode.  
While things were pretty much unchanged in 1990 (Figure 2), there are noticeable 
changes by 2006 (Figure 3): the distributions for Nigeria and Ethiopia shift to the right, while 
Congo-Zaire collapses. The modes of the Nigerian and Ethiopian distributions in 1990 were 
below the $1/day line; by 2006 they are well above it, and the Nigerian mode is approaching 
two dollars a day. However, about two thirds of the Congo-Zaire distribution lies to the left of 
the one-dollar-a-day poverty line while virtually the entire distribution is to the left of the 
$3/day threshold. For the continent as a whole, there is a slight movement of the distribution to 
the right. We notice that the mode of the distribution moves away from the $1/day line and 
gets close to the $2/day line. 
To observe the dynamics, Figure 4 plots the African distributions for 1970, 1990, 2000 
and 2006. If we look at the bottom of the distribution we notice a deterioration between 1970 
and 1990: African poverty increased over these two decades. However, there seems to be some 
improvement after 1990. The 2000 and especially the 2006 distributions move to the right, 
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The three vertical lines show the $1, $2 and $3/day poverty lines respectively









































The three vertical lines show the $1, $2 and $3/day poverty lines respectively
African Income Distribution in Year 1990



































The three vertical lines show the $1, $2 and $3/day poverty lines respectively
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The three vertical lines show the $1, $2 and $3/day poverty lines respectively
African Income Distribution: 1970-2006
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4  Poverty 
To better assess the evolution of poverty, Figure 5 and Table I display the yearly African poverty 
rate between 1970 and 2006. The poverty rate in 1970 was 0.398.  That is, close to 40% of the 
entire population lived with less than one dollar a day in Africa in 1970. After a small decline 
during the first half of the seventies, the rate jumped to around 0.42 in 1985 and stayed more or 
less at that level for a decade. In 1995 there is a dramatic change in trend: the poverty rate 
began a decline that led to a ten percentage point reduction by 2006. 
What caused this dramatic change? The answer can be seen in Figure 6, where the 
poverty rate is plotted along with African GDP per capita. The evolution of poverty is an almost 
exact mirror image of the evolution of GDP per capita. That is, the driving force that explains the 
substantial reduction in poverty between 1995 and 2006 is economic growth.  A similar 
conclusion is reached if we analyze the evolution of poverty and GDP per capita for the largest 
countries in the region. Figures 7-10 show that, for Ethiopia, South Africa, Nigeria and Congo-
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$1/Day Poverty and Growth in Ethiopia, 1970-2006
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$1/Day Poverty and Growth in Nigeria, 1970-2006
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$1/Day Poverty and Growth in Congo, Dem. Rep., 1970-2006
 
These results contradict the 2008 Millennium Development Goals Report (UN, 2008), 
which asserts that “little progress was made in reducing extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.” 
Our estimates disagree: the African poverty rate in 2006 was 0.318, 30% lower than in 1995 
(0.428) and 28% lower than in 1990 (0.421). That is, while progress in Africa has by no means 
been as extraordinary as that of East Asia, there has been a significant reduction in poverty and 
a substantial movement towards achieving the MDGs. The poverty rate in 1990 was 0.421. 
Hence, the MDG is for the poverty rate to be 0.210 by 2015. The rate in 2006 was 0.318, so even 
though substantial progress has been made, we still have ten basis points to go. But we also 
have 9 years left. We do not know what the future will look like, but if poverty continues to fall 
at the rates it fell between 1995 and 2006, we project that the $1/day poverty rate will be 0.228 
in 2015. In fact, we project that the MDG will be achieved by 2017: just two years late.
4  
                                                               
4 Of course our analysis excludes the impact of the 2008-2009 global recession. African GDP 
data for these years are not available yet so we are unable to assess the impact of the recession 
on African poverty.    14 
One reason why the MDGs are projected to be achieved two years late is the poor 
performance of Congo-Zaire over the last decade. Naturally, this poor economic performance 
has to do with the war that took place in that country during that decade. If we exclude Congo-
Zaire from our sample, the African poverty rate in 1990 was 0.417. Hence, the MDG is to cut 
that number to 0.209 by 2015. The poverty rate in 2006 was 0.279. Projecting the rate of 
progress between 1995 and 2006 into the future, we expect the African poverty rate to be 0.211 
in 2012 and 0.200 in 2013. That is, the MDG will be achieved two to three years ahead of time!  
Of course we don’t know whether poverty will continue to decline at the rates it fell 
between 1995 and 2006. But then again, we do not think that there is anything magic about 
2015 either. And we do not think there is anything special about “halving the 1990 poverty 
rate.” In other words, the MDGs are interesting goals but if the 1990 poverty rate is cut by one 
half in 2016 or 2020 rather than 2015, so what? The main point is that Africa has been moving in 
the right direction and, while progress has not been as substantial and spectacular as in Asia, 
poverty has been falling and it has been falling substantially. We should not let the literal 
interpretation of the MDGs turn good news (Africa is rapidly moving in the right direction) into 
bad news (Africa will not achieve the MDGs on time).
5 
Column 2 of Table I displays the evolution of the $2/day poverty rate. The rate was 
0.652 in 1970, it increased to 0.679 by 1995 and then it started a declining trend to 0.595 by 
2006. Figure 11 displays the cumulative distribution function of the African distribution of 
income. The image of the CDF corresponds to the poverty rate if the poverty threshold 
happened to be the level of income in the horizontal axis. We see that for most conceivable 
poverty lines, the poverty rate between 1990 and 2006 has fallen. In particular, this is true for 
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5  Inequality  and Welfare 
This section analyzes the evolution of inequality and welfare. Many analysts claim that, 
because Africa’s economy is largely based on natural resources, the growth rate of the last 
decade has benefited mainly the political and economic elites that own those resources. If this 
were true, we should observe an explosion in all measures of income inequality. And, of course, 
this can be checked with our data. Figure 12 displays the overall Gini coefficient for Africa: 
starting at a level of around 0.63, the inequality index increased to around 0.66 during the 1970s 
and the first half of the 1980s. Then it stayed at that level until the early 1990s and started a 
downward trend that took it to its initial level by 2006. In other words, during the period of 
positive and sustained African growth (1995 to 2006), not only did inequality not explode – as it 
would have if all the growth had accrued to a narrow elite – but inequality actually declined 
substantially.   16 
As is well known (e.g., Cowell 2000), the Gini coefficient is not decomposable in the 
sense that the sum of “within-country inequality” and “between-country inequality” do not add 
up to “global inequality”. Two measures of inequality that are decomposable are the Mean 
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) and the Theil Index. The two belong to the family of Generalized 
Entropy (GE) indexes: the MLD is the GE Index with coefficient zero and the Theil index is the GE 
index with coefficient one. Figures 13 and 14 show global African inequality according to both 
the MLD and Theil indexes. They both follow a pattern similar to that of the Gini: increasing 
between 1970 and 1985, remaining at that level for a few years and, in 1990, beginning a 
downward trend until 2006.  
When we decompose the overall inequality index into its two components we see that, 
in 1970, most of the overall African inequality can be accounted for by within-country 
inequality. Within-country inequality, however, declines over the sample period (indicating that 
it is not true that all the extra income generated by the growth process that took place between 
1990 and 2006 went to a few) while between-country inequality increases, by 2006, the within- 
and between-country inequality measures are about the same. That is, by 2006, half of the 
overall inequality is accounted for by the within-country component and the other half by the 
between-country component. 
Our estimates of African inequality allow us to measure African welfare. For example, 
Amartya Sen (1976) proposed a measure of welfare equal to GDP per capita time one minus the 
Gini coefficient. Since we have estimated the Gini coefficient, we can calculate the Sen index for 
Africa. The results are displayed in Figure 15: African welfare declined substantially between 
1970 and 1995, but the trend was reversed dramatically between 1995 and 2006. During this 
decade, the two components of the index moved in the same direction: mean income increased 
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6  Regional Analysis 
It is interesting to see whether African poverty reduction has been not only fast, but also 
general across characteristics of countries that the literature has identified as important for 
development. Bloom and Sachs (1998) point to adverse geography as a cause of slow 
development: in particular, countries that have unfavorable agriculture should be poorer than 
countries with more favorable conditions. Collier (2006) argues that coastal countries will 
perform better than landlocked countries in general. Also, mineral-rich countries should have 
been better-positioned than mineral-poor countries to take advantage of the increase in natural 
resource prices in the 2000s. For example, the 2008 UN Millennium Development Goals Report 
states that “since 2002, one of the factors contributing to growth in many developing countries... 
has been the increased prices of commodities, including oil. For exporters, this has been a boon. 
But higher commodity prices, particularly oil prices, have dampened growth in countries 
importing these products. Many are among the poorest countries in the world.” Collier (2006), 
suggests that being mineral-rich or mineral-poor will matter differently for coastal and 
landlocked countries. 
Others have suggested that troubled history may have a persistent effect on growth 
performance. Nunn (2008), for example, argues that the African slave trade had “particularly 
detrimental consequences, including social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability and a 
weakening of states, and the corruption of judicial institutions,” which led the parts of Africa 
most affected by the slave trade to grow much slower than the parts that were not. La Porta et 
al. (1999) suggest that the identity of the colonizer mattered substantially for development. 
Since these factors are permanent (and cannot be changed with good policy), they imply that 
some parts of Africa may be at a persistent growth disadvantage relative to others.  
In this section, we show the differential growth and poverty reduction performance of these 
types of African countries. Figure 16 breaks down Africa into landlocked and coastal countries. 
The list of countries in each category is provided in Appendix Table I. Panel A shows that 
between 1970 and 2006, both GDP per capita and the growth rate were larger for coastal than 
for landlocked countries. Panel B displays the evolution of the poverty rate for the two regions. 
As expected, the poverty rate for coastal countries is smaller. The interesting phenomenon, 
however, is that poverty in landlocked countries has also fallen. In fact, it has fallen faster than 
in coastal regions, especially over the last decade. Poverty in the mid-1990s was close to 55% for   20 
the landlocked and about 35% the coastal countries. By 2006 the poverty rates in the two 
regions was 35% and 30% respectively. Hence, it does not appear that being landlocked is an 
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Landlocked vs. Coastal Countries: Poverty
 
 
Figure 17 breaks down the sample of African countries into mineral-rich and mineral-
poor. The definition of mineral-rich is taken from Nijkam (2008) and supplemented with data 
from the CIA World Factbook (2009).
6 The list of countries in each classification is provided in 
Appendix Table I. Panel A shows that mineral-rich countries have higher levels of GDP per capita 
and that their growth rate experienced an inflection at some point during the mid-nineties. GDP 
per capita for mineral-poor countries has been growing steadily throughout the sample period. 
Panel B shows that, while poverty rates in mineral-rich countries started out being much lower 
than in mineral-poor countries in the 1970s; by the mid-1980s the poverty rates in the two 
regions were about the same. Since then, the rates in mineral-rich and mineral-poor countries 
have fallen very similarly. By 2006, the poverty rate in mineral-poor was actually lower than in 
mineral-rich countries. Hence, the notion that African progress in poverty reduction is a 
statistical artifact due entirely or even mainly the favorable terms of trade shocks of the 
mineral-rich countries does not appear to be consistent with the data. 
 
                                                               
6 For the mineral-rich/mineral-poor breakdown, as well as for the favorable/unfavorable 
agriculture breakdown, omitting the countries not classified by Nijkam (2008) from the analysis 
does not qualitatively change the results   21 
Figure 17 
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Mineral-Rich vs. Mineral-Poor Countries: Poverty
 
Following Collier (2006) we also look at the differential performance of mineral-poor 
countries depending on whether they are landlocked or coastal. The definitions are derived 
from Nijkam (2008) and the CIA World Factbook by combining the definitions for landlocked and 
mineral-poor countries that are presented in Appendix Table I. Figure 18 shows the GDP per 
capita and the poverty rates over time for these two sets of countries. Panel A confirms Collier 
(2006) by showing that the GDP per capita of landlocked mineral-poor countries is much lower 
than that of coastal mineral-poor countries. In fact, the GDP per capita of coastal mineral-poor 
countries is close to the average GDP per capita for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Panel B 
shows that the huge gap in GDP between landlocked and coastal mineral-poor countries has not 
been an insurmountable barrier to poverty reduction in the landlocked mineral-poor countries: 
since 1995, landlocked mineral-poor countries have cut their poverty rate by more than 20 
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Figure 18 
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We now compare the performance of countries with favorable and unfavorable 
agricultural environments. The definition of favorable and unfavorable agriculture is taken from 
Nijkam (2008) and supplemented with data from the CIA World Factbook (2009). The list of 
countries in each category is provided in Appendix Table I. Panel A of Figure 19 shows that 
African countries with favorable agricultural environments are richer although countries with 
unfavorable agriculture seem to have converged over the last ten years. Panel B shows that the 
speed at which poverty has fallen in the unfavorable agriculture countries has been staggering: 
from more than 50% in the mid-nineties to just above 30% in 2006. The poverty rate of 
countries with favorable agricultural environments has fluctuated around 35% throughout the 
sample period, with a decline at the end of the sample period. Interestingly, the rate in 2006 
was lower in the unfavorable than in the favorable countries, even though it was more than 10 
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Figure 19 
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Favorable vs. Unfavorable Agriculture Countries: Poverty
 
We now compare the performance of countries at war with countries at peace.  Since 
many African countries have been at war at some point during the sample period, we use 1997 
(the last year of the availability of Correlates of War data) as a breaking point. A country is 
labeled to be at war if it was at war in 1997 and it is labeled to be at peace if it is at peace in 
1997 according to the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees 2000). Appendix Table I provides a list 
of countries at war in 1997. Figure 20 shows the differential performance of both sets of 
countries. Countries at peace are richer and have experienced positive growth rates almost 
constantly during the sample period. Countries at war, on the other hand, experienced negative 
growth between 1970 and 2000 and a slight positive growth rate between 2000 and 2006. Panel 
B shows that the poverty rate of countries at peace was close to 40% in 1970 (larger than the 
rate of countries at war!). The rate remained almost constant for twenty years. But in 1990, the 
poverty rate of countries at peace started to decline. The rate was close to 25% by 2006. The 
poverty rate of countries at war, on the other hand, started at about 30% in 1970 and grew to 
about 55% by 2000. A small improvement during the last five years left the rate at just below 
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Figure 20 
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Nunn (2008) argues that a substantial part of Africa’s underdevelopment can be 
explained by the African slave trades. In essence, countries that did not suffer from the slave 
trades should tend to perform better than countries that did because the slave trades had 
damaging and permanent effects such as social and ethnic fragmentation, political instability 
and a weakening of states, and the corruption of judicial institutions. To assess this point Figure 
21 decomposes Africa into countries that had slave exports per capita above (high-slave 
countries) and below (low-slave countries) the African median respectively. The definitions are 
taken from Nunn (2008) and the list of countries in each category is reported in Appendix Table 
I. Panel A shows that low-slave countries are richer in the sense of having larger GDP per capita 
than high-slave countries. Panel B shows that the evolution of poverty has been more favorable 
for high-slave countries. Starting from a level of over 50% in the mid 1980s, the poverty rate in 
high-slave countries declined dramatically over the following two and a half decades. The 
poverty rate was 35% in 2006. The poverty rate of low-slave countries, on the other hand, 
started at around 25% in the 1970s and it increased to over 30% by 1993. Poverty for low-slave 
countries levels off and slightly declines after 1995.  It is surprising that poverty declines so little 
for the low-slave countries, but this can largely be explained because most of the growth that 
low-slave countries experienced since took place in countries that already had relatively low 
poverty in 1995, whereas the low-slave countries with substantial poverty grew relatively little 
in the aggregate since 1995.  
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Figure 21 
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Finally, we compare the experience of African countries by colonial origin.  La Porta et 
al. (1999) argue that colonized countries inherited the legal framework of their colonizers and 
that some legal frameworks are more favorable to development than others. Panel A of Figure 
22 displays the evolution of GDP. Former British colonies are richer than former French colonies. 
Portuguese colonies started out being the richest in 1970 but their GDP per capita declined 
rapidly in the 1970s due to the civil wars in Angola (1975-2002) and Mozambique (1977-1992). 
The positive growth rates over the last decade allowed the Portuguese colonies to become 
richer than the French colonies (although not richer than the British colonies) by 2006. Belgian 
former colonies (essentially Congo-Zaire and the two small countries of Rwanda and Burundi) 
witnessed a continued decline in GDP because of the poor performance of Congo-Zaire during 
the conflict surrounding the end of the Mobutu regime in 1997. The Congo war meant that 
poverty in the former Belgian colonies increased dramatically between 1990 and 2006 (Panel B). 
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Figure 22 
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  Our conclusion is that African poverty reduction has not only been large, but it also has 
been general, affecting many different types of countries. It is important to understand what 
our regional results do and do not imply. There is nothing in these results that should be 
interpreted as causal: the variation we are using is not exogenous. In particular, we cannot 
conclude that there is an “advantage to backwardness” because countries with disadvantaged 
history or geography reduce poverty faster (for instance, we may observe this because these 
countries are poorer in the first place, and have more poverty to reduce). However, we can 
conclude that neither geography nor history is destiny: it is possible for countries with poor 
geography and troubled history not only to reduce poverty rapidly, but to converge to the more 
advantaged countries, at least for the range of the data that we observe.  
 
7  Robustness 
In order to be confident in our results, we analyze changing the baseline specification in 
several directions. Figure 23 presents the $1/day poverty rate for Africa under all the variations 
pertaining to extrapolation and functional form described in Section 2, as well as for World Bank 
and Maddison GDP. It is clear that the differences in estimates are very small, so that not only 
does poverty decline for each specification, but estimates from each specification follow the 
same qualitative pattern. Moreover, poverty declines across all specifications, so that the 
highest value for poverty across specifications in 2006 is less than the lowest value for poverty in   27 
1970 (the starting year) or in 1995 (the year in which the declining trend begins). The only series 
that do not substantively match the baseline series are those for which the inequality 
parameters were produced by inverting the Gini, or by using the middle three quintiles only, as 
well as the series based on World Bank GDP after the PPP revision, which are shown in Figure 
24. However, these three series also follow the same qualitative pattern as the baseline. 
Interestingly, the series based on the middle three quintiles, which should not depend on 
mismeasurements of income at the top or at the bottom of the distribution, shows a lower level 
of poverty for the entire sample period, which suggests that if the functional form assumption is 
correct, then mismeasurement of income takes place primarily for the poor, probably through 
undervaluing in-kind income.  
  Figures 25 and 26 present the series of the Gini coefficient for Africa. We again see that 
most of the series follow the baseline very closely. Only the series for different methods of 
computing lognormal parameters from quintiles and the series for Maddison GDP exhibiting 
large deviations from the baseline, but still with largely the same qualitative trends. The same is 
true for Figures 27 and 28, which show the series of Sen Welfare. 
  We also use these variations, alongside with the standard variations of excluding one 
large country, to perform a robustness check on our predictions for when the Millennium 
Development Goals will be achieved. Table II shows the results of the extrapolations. The MDGs 
are achieved in 2027 or earlier for all variations, with the MDGs achieved between 2013 and 
2020 for most variations. While for some variations (e.g. using revised World Bank GDP), the 
MDGs are achieved twelve years behind schedule, for most of them, the MDGs are late by no 
more than 5 years, and for all of them, the poverty-reducing performance of Africa over the past 
11 years (1995-2006) suggests that the Millennium Development Goals will be met in a 
reasonable amount of time. Table III shows the results of the extrapolations if Congo-Zaire is 
excluded from extrapolation, which assumes that as Congo-Zaire recovers from its war, it will 
reduce poverty sufficiently quickly to converge to the African mean poverty level. Then, the 
MDGs are met by 2015, except for the variations involving changing the source of GDP, and 
even then, the Millennium Development Goals are met by 2022. In results not reported, we 
check that the regional results described in Section 6 are valid qualitatively with the omission of 
any large country.   28 
  A final, but important, concern is that our results are being driven by survey selection. 
First, the number of surveys declines for the last years of the sample. If our extrapolation 
procedure understates inequality in Africa for these years, then poverty reduction will appear 
greater than it really is. This concern is partially addressed by our variations for extrapolation; 
neither the series with linear extrapolation nor the one with horizontal extrapolation vary much 
from the baseline series. Since the linear extrapolation series is sensitive to trends in inequality 
at the end of the sample period, this means that there were no incipient trends for inequality to 
rise in large African countries, which might have produced rising inequality in Africa overall that 
might have prevented growth from translating into poverty reduction. A further concern is that 
the surveys at the beginning of the period tend to be income surveys, whereas the surveys at 
the end of the period overwhelmingly are consumption surveys, and income is more unequally 
distributed than consumption is. Hence, the fall in inequality that we observe during the 1990s 
and the 2000s might simply be a result of inadequately correcting for the fact that consumption 
inequality is lower than income inequality.  
To investigate theses concerns explicitly, we plot the poverty and inequality series 
alongside with measures of survey availability: We construct the fraction of Africans either 
covered by an income survey, or with there being an income survey in their country both before 
and after the given year, for each year, and similarly for consumption surveys. These fractions 
are the income and consumption “cores” plotted in Figures 29 and 30, and they show the extent 
of coverage of income and consumption surveys. Looking at Figure 29, we see that the decline in 
poverty rates begins long after most surveys are consumption surveys, and that the trend in 
poverty decline is nearly identical (though slightly smaller) before the collapses in the fraction 
covered by surveys in 2000 and 2003 as afterwards. Moreover, from Figure 30 we see that while 
the collapse in survey coverage is accompanied by a leveling off of the Gini, this leveling off 
breaks a long-running downward trend in the Gini, and so, if anything, exaggerates inequality in 
the years 2002-2006. The decline in the Gini over the 1990s occurs long after the time that most 
of the surveys become consumption surveys, and occurs under a high survey coverage rate. To 
argue that we are understating inequality in the later parts of the sample period, one needs to 
assert that this declining trend broke abruptly in 2002-2006, and there is nothing in the data to 
support such an assertion. 
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8  Conclusion 
Our main conclusion is that Africa is reducing poverty, and doing it much faster than we 
thought. The growth from the period 1995-2006, far from benefiting only the elites, has been 
sufficiently widely spread that both total African inequality and African within-country inequality 
actually declined over this period. In particular, the speed at which Africa has reduced poverty 
since 1995 puts it on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty 
relative to 1990 by 2015 on time or, at worst, a couple of years late. If Congo-Zaire converges to 
Africa once it is stabilized, the MDG will be achieved by 2012, three years before the target date. 
These results are qualitatively robust to changes in our methodology, including using different 
data sources and assumptions for what happens to inequality when inequality data is not 
available. 
We also find that the African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be 
explained by a large country, or even by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial 
geographical or historical characteristic. All classes of countries, including those with 
disadvantageous geography and history, experience reductions in poverty. In particular, poverty 
fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for mineral-rich as well as mineral-poor 
countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless 
of colonial origin; and for countries with below- or above-median slave exports per capita during 
the African slave trade. This observation is particularly important because it shows that poor 
geography and history have not posed insurmountable obstacles to poverty reduction. The 
lesson we draw is largely optimistic: even the most troubled parts of the poorest continent can 
set themselves firmly on the trend of limiting and even eradicating poverty within the space of a 
decade.   34 
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Angola  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  1 
Burundi  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Benin  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Burkina Faso  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Botswana  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Central African Republic  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Cote d'Ivoire  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Cameroon  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Congo, Rep.  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
Comoros  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Cape Verde  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Ethiopia  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Gabon  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Ghana  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Guinea  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Gambia, The  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Guinea-Bissau  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0 
Equatorial Guinea  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Kenya  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Lesotho  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Madagascar  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Mali  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Mozambique  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0 
Mauritania  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Mauritius  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Malawi  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Namibia  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Niger  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Nigeria  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Rwanda  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Senegal  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Seychelles  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Togo  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Tunisia  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Tanzania  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Uganda  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  1 
South Africa  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Zambia  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Zimbabwe  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Sao Tome and Principe  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Chad  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Sierra Leone  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Liberia  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sudan  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1 
Somalia  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Swaziland  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Eritrea  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Total  48  19  23  17  18  5  3  24  8 
 
Note: “1” indicates country belongs to category, “0” that it does not belong, red numbers indicate imputation on basis of CIA World 
Factbook. Sources: for geographical variables, Nijkam (2008) and the CIA World Factbook, for the war variable, Correlates of War 
(2008). 
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1970  0.398  0.652 
1971  0.388  0.643 
1972  0.378  0.634 
1973  0.377  0.634 
1974  0.370  0.628 
1975  0.377  0.637 
1976  0.374  0.634 
1977  0.374  0.634 
1978  0.376  0.634 
1979  0.388  0.644 
1980  0.393  0.649 
1981  0.394  0.648 
1982  0.402  0.653 
1983  0.410  0.660 
1984  0.427  0.673 
1985  0.426  0.671 
1986  0.421  0.666 
1987  0.436  0.672 
1988  0.419  0.663 
1989  0.423  0.662 
1990  0.416  0.658 
1991  0.419  0.659 
1992  0.420  0.666 
1993  0.422  0.671 
1994  0.421  0.672 
1995  0.428  0.679 
1996  0.415  0.666 
1997  0.401  0.657 







1999  0.396  0.654 
2000  0.383  0.652 
2001  0.378  0.649 
2002  0.374  0.645 
2003  0.355  0.630 
2004  0.345  0.622 
2005  0.331  0.609 
2006  0.318  0.595 
2007  0.308  0.587 
2008  0.298  0.579 
2009  0.288  0.572 
2010  0.278  0.564 
2011  0.268  0.557 
2012  0.258  0.549 
2013  0.248  0.541 
2014  0.238  0.534 
2015  0.228  0.526 
2016  0.218  0.518 
2017  0.208  0.511 
2018  0.198  0.503 
2019  0.188  0.496 
2020  0.178  0.488 
2021  0.168  0.480 
2022  0.158  0.473 
2023  0.148  0.465 
2024  0.138  0.457 
2025  0.128  0.450 
 
 
Note: red numbers are projections based on linear extrapolation at the average poverty 
reduction rate between 1995 and 2006.  37 






Percentage Poverty  
Reduction 1990-2006 
Projected Poverty 
 in 2015  
Projected Poverty  
Reduction, 1990-2015 
Year in which  
MDG Attained 
Baseline  41.6%  31.8%  -23.5%  22.8%  -45.2%  2017 
Hybrid Extrapolation  41.5%  30.9%  -25.6%  21.3%  -48.7%  2016 
Linear Extrapolation  41.5%  29.2%  -29.6%  17.9%  -56.8%  2013 
Ginis  45.4%  35.7%  -21.4%  27.1%  -40.3%  2020 
Adjusted  38.0%  28.3%  -25.6%  19.8%  -48.0%  2016 
Gamma, Ginis  45.4%  36.7%  -19.1%  29.6%  -34.9%  2024 
Gamma, Regular  41.6%  32.8%  -21.1%  25.2%  -39.4%  2020 
Gamma, Adjusted  34.6%  26.5%  -23.5%  19.3%  -44.3%  2017 
Weibull, Ginis  44.9%  36.5%  -18.7%  29.4%  -34.6%  2024 
Weibull, Regular  41.3%  33.0%  -20.2%  25.6%  -38.0%  2021 
Weibull, Adjusted  34.1%  26.4%  -22.4%  19.8%  -42.0%  2019 
Optimal, Ginis  45.4%  35.7%  -21.4%  27.0%  -40.4%  2020 
Optimal, Regular  41.6%  31.8%  -23.6%  22.8%  -45.3%  2017 
Optimal, Adjusted  37.9%  28.2%  -25.7%  19.7%  -48.1%  2016 
World Bank  40.2%  33.1%  -17.6%  25.5%  -36.6%  2021 
Maddison  39.4%  35.3%*  -10.4%*  27.2%  -31.1%  2026 
World Bank, PPP 
Revision  48.6%  40.5%  -16.6%  33.6%  -30.9%  2027 
Excludes Nigeria  40.6%  33.2%  -18.3%  25.9%  -36.2%  2022 
Excludes Ethiopia  38.4%  32.2%  -16.1%  25.0%  -34.9%  2022 
Excludes Congo-Zaire  41.3%  27.9%  -32.3%  17.7%  -57.0%  2012 
Excludes South Africa  44.4%  33.6%  -24.3%  23.9%  -46.3%  2017 
Excludes Sudan  41.5%  32.0%  -22.9%  23.0%  -44.6%  2017 
Excludes Tanzania  40.2%  32.0%  -20.4%  24.3%  -39.4%  2020 
Excludes Kenya  41.5%  31.5%  -24.2%  21.6%  -48.0%  2016 
Excludes Uganda  41.0%  31.4%  -23.4%  22.4%  -45.4%  2017 
             
Note: We assume that poverty declines linearly at the average rate of decline between 1995 and 2006 
* The Maddison GDP series we use goes up to 2003 instead of 2006.       38 
 









 in 2015  
Projected Poverty 
Reduction, 1990-2015 
Year in which  
MDG Achieved 
Baseline  41.3%  27.9%  -32.3%  17.7%  -57.0%  2012 
Hybrid Extrapolation  41.2%  26.9%  -34.6%  16.1%  -60.8%  2011 
Linear Extrapolation  41.2%  25.1%  -39.0%  12.5%  -69.6%  2009 
Ginis  45.1%  32.1%  -28.8%  22.4%  -50.3%  2015 
Adjusted  37.7%  24.2%  -36.0%  14.5%  -61.7%  2011 
Gamma, Ginis  45.3%  33.6%  -25.7%  25.5%  -43.6%  2018 
Gamma, Regular  41.4%  29.4%  -28.9%  20.7%  -49.9%  2015 
Gamma, Adjusted  34.5%  22.5%  -34.7%  14.2%  -58.8%  2012 
Weibull, Ginis  44.7%  33.4%  -25.4%  25.3%  -43.4%  2018 
Weibull, Regular  41.2%  29.7%  -27.9%  21.3%  -48.3%  2016 
Weibull, Adjusted  33.9%  22.6%  -33.4%  14.8%  -56.3%  2013 
Optimal, Ginis  45.0%  32.0%  -28.8%  22.3%  -50.4%  2015 
Optimal, Regular  41.3%  27.9%  -32.4%  17.7%  -57.1%  2012 
Optimal, Adjusted  37.6%  24.0%  -36.1%  14.3%  -61.9%  2011 
World Bank  41.1%  31.1%  -24.1%  22.6%  -44.9%  2017 
Maddison  38.4%  31.4%*  -18.3%*  21.3%  -44.4%  2018 
World Bank, PPP 
Revision  47.1%  36.8%  -21.9%  29.2%  -38.0%  2022 
 
* The Maddison GDP series we use goes up to 2003 instead of 2006 